McDonald’s WW Market Research 2024

Market Research Restaurant Report for McDonalds and Other – Worldwide

Report on restaurant market research and kiosks worldwide by Dataos (RBR). Much better than the usual internet scrapes for the Indian datamarts like Research & Markets.  They actually contacted us and we provided input on McDonald’s and Burger King.  Wendy’s too. Other research conpanies do not canvas people so kudos to Datos/RBR

It’s pretty clear though the bias is “Not the US” as the central theme. Certainly Acrelec has McDonalds but the franchise option is not always executed.  We have never seen kiosks in Burger King or KFC here in the US. Pretty much all drive thru.

  • As far as Acrelec goes it is important to note they are software as much as hardware.  Not common knowledge but we know they have over 30K software licenses in play and they are close to announcing more.

McDonald’s is actually more ROW (40K restaurants) than US (14000 restaurants).  And worth noting 700 of those in US are owned by McDonalds. The others are franchisees.  Other McDonalds players which seems to be not noted would be the Verifone/Zivelo original along with Evoke in UK.

McDonalds splits its supply chain fairly evenly into multiple suppliers (DN, Verifone, Acrelec, Evoke and Coates to name notables).  In the US Coates made the first investment followed later by Acrelec. Worth noting Verifone/Zivelo is rumored to be withdrawing from the market (mostly US).  Verifone was pitching PO it wanted to dispose of.

mcdonalds drive thru menu board

Meanwhile, how to save on menu board software. Do old school. McDonalds down the street.

We recently toured just completed new “counterless” McDonald’s (no menu boards above a short counter) here in Colorado.  Also the drive thru menu boards are facing directly into the sun. We saw menu board failures in California and Coates screens. These are also Coates screens and we’ll see if they learned anything (or went cheap)

  • And the “Diebold” kiosks are Pyramid of Germany white labeled.  Nice of Datos to include that nugget from us in their report (with zero credit I might add).

Our take:

  • Doesn’t appear Datos/RBR is going to offer any insight on US Market.
  • Very very pricey report. Will be out of date in a week?
  • How much longer will McDonald’s use the big standup totem kiosks with 32 inch monitors?  Here is a new 2024 iteration of McDonalds in Denver with basically no counter, no menu boards and only a row of ordering kiosks
  • How much longer before they go voice order? Here is a 2024 demo of McDonalds voice order being tested.
  • When will McDonalds start utilizing the walls. They are already removing drinks and condiment stations
  • Worth noting — 65% of sales at McDonalds is thru Drive Thru. Chick-Fil-A is the same (and drive-thrus getting bigger)

Meanwhile here is summary of article

  1. Market Growth and Competition:
    • Over 345,000 self-ordering kiosks were installed globally by June 2023
    • The market is competitive, with around 180 hardware and software vendors working with QSR chains
    • Acrelec leads the hardware market, supplying McDonald’s, Burger King, and KFC
    • Other players include HiStone, Taiyun, Coates Group, Elo, and Diebold Nixdorf.
  2. Global and Local Vendors:
    • International players like Samsung and LG, along with local suppliers, compete for kiosk business
    • China’s CCL Technology and Taiwan’s Posiflex have a growing presence in Europe and the Middle East
    • Brazil’s Videosoft and Poland’s M4B also work with QSR chains
  3. Software and Digital Transformation:
    • Many restaurants deploy self-ordering kiosks alongside mobile ordering as part of digital transformation
    • McDonald’s uses an in-house solution, while other QSR brands partner with third-party software suppliers
    • Demand for kiosks continues to grow, with RBR Data Services forecasting 130,000 kiosks shipped globally by 2028

PRESS RELEASE

Nearly 55,000 self-ordering kiosks were delivered in the year to June 2023, with an increasing number of hardware and software suppliers entering the market

New players enter the kiosk business to meet unprecedented demand

Global investment in self-ordering kiosks by quick-service restaurant (QSR) chains is increasing strongly, with more than 345,000 installed as of June 2023, according to Global Self-Ordering Kiosks, the latest study by RBR Data Services, a division of Datos Insights. The market is becoming even more competitive, with around 180 hardware and software vendors working with clients from global fast-food giants to independents.

Acrelec leads the global kiosk hardware market

restaurant market research

restaurant market research

Self-service and digital technology firm Acrelec has the largest share of the self-ordering kiosk market. The French manufacturer accounts for 16% of global hardware shipments, supplying McDonald’s and other leading QSR firms such as Burger King and KFC. Many of its customers also use kiosk software from Acrelec.

Chinese hardware suppliers HiStone and Taiyun both have a strong foothold in their home market, delivering to local QSR chain Dicos and McDonald’s respectively. Meanwhile, Australia’s Coates Group supplies kiosk hardware to McDonald’s and other customers across a range of Asian countries, from India to South Korea.

US-based Elo is the largest hardware vendor to the Americas region, counting Taco Bell as well as a vast number of small and medium-sized chains among its clients. Diebold Nixdorf also has a strong presence in the region, supplying kiosks manufactured by German firm Pyramid to McDonald’s in the US and Canada.

 

International and local vendors compete for kiosk business

Global Self-Ordering Kiosks 2024 shows that a wide range of suppliers have entered the kiosk business in recent years. These include Korean electronics giants Samsung and LG, with the former’s hardware deployed in its home market and internationally. Elsewhere, China’s CCL Technology and Taiwan’s Posiflex have a growing presence in Europe and the Middle East.

Local suppliers are also competing with international firms for new business. Vendors including Brazil’s Videosoft and Poland’s M4B are working with QSR chains in their home markets and beyond.

Restaurants work with a vast range of software suppliers to modernise technology

Many restaurant chains and independents have deployed self-ordering kiosks alongside mobile ordering and other channels as part of a wider software-led digital transformation strategy. With software vendors much in demand, the market is increasingly fragmented.

McDonald’s has developed an in-house solution to run on its kiosks, however, many QSR brands use third-party software suppliers; these include China’s Rydeen, Sixun and Shiji Group, which supply both local chains and global brands in their home market. US firms Tillster, which works with Burger King in many countries, GRUBBRR and Bite all partner with a range of different hardware firms for kiosks.

As demand for the technology continues to grow among restaurant chains of all sizes, the global kiosk market presents considerable opportunities to international, regional and local suppliers of both hardware and software, with RBR Data Services forecasting the number of kiosks shipped globally to reach 130,000 by 2028.

 

Notes to editors

About RBR Data Services

RBR Data Services provides clients with independent and reliable data and insights through published research, consulting and bespoke data services. Our global research covers the cards and payments, retail technology and banking automation sectors and is used by the leading market participants, analysts and regulators as the authoritative source of industry and competitor benchmark data. For any questions about this release, please contact [email protected].

About Datos Insights

Datos Insights delivers the most comprehensive and industry-specific data and advice to the companies trusted to protect and grow the world’s assets, and to the technology and service providers who support them. Staffed by experienced industry executives, researchers, and consultants, we support the world’s most progressive banks, insurers, investment firms, and technology companies through a mix of insights and advisory subscriptions, data services, custom projects and consulting, conferences, and executive councils.

The information and data within this press release are the copyright of Datos Insights, and may only be quoted with appropriate attribution to RBR Data Services, a division of Datos Insights. The information is provided free of charge and may not be resold.

Touchscreen or Person – Which is Better?

retail kiosk

If The Shoe Fits, then buy it!

How easy is it to find the shoe size 12 (46 EU) or larger? The answer is “It Depends”

Christoph Nussbaumer CEO of Alpine Kiosk

Christoph Nussbaumer CEO of Alpine Kiosk

About the WriterChristoph Nussbaumer is the CEO of REINGroup based in Austria. Alpine Kiosk boasts a diverse array of designs, each is highly adaptive and radiating elegance and sophistication.  Alpine Kiosk – Where each design is a testament to premium craftsmanship.  Alpine Kiosk is Gold Supporter of Kiosk Industry Group and member of the KMA Kiosk Association. His viewpoint from Europe and US is invaluable.


Previously we discussed “machine vs. human in fast food restaurants”. Today let’s explore service in shoe retail.

An Unplanned Experiment in Shoe Shopping

Are we talking about shopping online or in-store? Which region are we discussing? USA, EU, Asia…? Male or female?

As a male shopping for shoes in the USA or Central Europe, I can tell you that most of the time I walk out of the store empty-handed.
Even when I do find a pair, it’s often not the one I initially liked. The question is why? Am I the only one?

Last week I needed new business shoes. I usually shop online, but for shoes, I have to try them on and walk a few steps.

Honestly, I’m too lazy to order multiple pairs, try them on, pack them up, label them, and send them back. It’s just too much hassle.

I like to get a purchase done in under 5 minutes: walk into the store, choose my favorite pair, try them on, walk a few steps, pay, and leave.

During my last visit to the store, I found a nice pair but not my size on the shelf. I walked around looking for a staff member. They were busy, so I waited. Finally, I asked, and she checked, saying, “Sorry, we don’t have it.” I found another pair and looked for help again. After waiting, she checked the system and said my size was at a store 10 miles away.

Two tries, no results. It made me think about how much time we waste on simple things.

I missed the online shopping experience: set a filter to size 12-13 (46 EU), hit the button, and see all that’s available.

Data Insights: Online vs. Offline

Online Returns: Online shoe return rates can be 35-40%, sometimes reaching 50% because customers can’t try shoes on before buying. (Footwearmagazine)

Offline Returns: Physical stores have a lower return rate of 8-10% as customers can try on shoes. (Markinblog)

Why Do People Return Shoes?

  • Fit Issues: Fit problems cause 65% of returns
  • Product Mismatch: Items not matching descriptions or arriving damaged
  • Bracketing: Buying multiple sizes to ensure fit increases returns (Digital Commerce 360).

Retail Kiosks Conclusion

The difference between online and offline shopping highlights a major opportunity for offline retailers. Customers value in-store fit feedback but go online for convenience and selection. To maximize benefits, stores should provide real-time inventory checks, a wide range of products, and easy ordering for out-of-stock items.

shoe kiosk

shoe kiosk

Questions for the Consumer

  • How often do you struggle to find your shoe size in-store?
  • Have you ever had to visit multiple stores to find your size?
  • Would real-time inventory information in-store improve your shopping experience?
  • How useful would it be to know instantly if a nearby store has your size?
  • How often and how long do you wait for an employee to check for your size?
  • How many times have you left a store empty-handed because your size wasn’t available?

Questions for the Store Owner

  • How much time do your staff spend checking shoe sizes and availability for customers?
  • How do you currently ensure all sizes are available for customers in-store?
  • What steps do you take to keep customers from leaving due to out-of-stock sizes?
  • How often do customers leave your store without buying because their size isn’t available?
  • How many customers leave your store daily without making a purchase? Why? Did they search for a size or a model? You don’t know, right?

Service in the Moment: Human vs. Machine

What I asked myself: How often would a customer ask for size availability, wait for staff to check, just to hear it’s not available, and choose another model?

How many just take a picture, leave, and order online at another place?

The Role of Technology: Enhancing Customer Support

If I imagined there was a prominently placed self-service kiosk with a large interface in the store, I could walk there, scan the box of shoes, and get real-time information such as:

  • Is my size available here?
  • Is my size available in nearby stores?
  • Which similar models are available?
  • Detailed information about this shoe (collection, materials, usage, etc.)
  • If only available online: order and pay directly, get delivered to my home.

The Benefits for Store Owners and Customers

All of this would have happened without any waiting time. The store would not have lost my business.

Concluding Thoughts: A Synergy of Service

Am I saying: Self-service wins in this case?

No, not at all. But it takes away simple standard jobs from the employees, making them even more efficient. They can focus more on customers who need real human interaction and support or who are not as tech-savvy.

There is no winner, but some services can be handled better by a kiosk, and some by a human being.

This brings up questions for the store owner:

  • How much could sales increase if every size was always available?
  • If there were no more waiting lines?
  • If no more customers walked out because they could order directly from your online store (store-in-store concept)?

A Look Forward: Incorporating Technology for Enhanced Retail Experiences

Furthermore, think about the data insights:

  • most popular models
  • sizes
  • lookups but no purchase, why?
  • And many more in real-time.

Now there might be voices in the industry saying: we tried it and failed.

The question is why did they fail? Was there any analysis?

I once visited a US sports retail chain with a large sports shoe department. The digital support they offered was a tiny tablet on a stick with a bad UI.

I hate looking down and scrolling on my small phone screen when in a store to research something. Why should I do it with a device on low height and a tiny screen in the store?

A huge screen with generous room for a nice presentation of the product and information I want, that’s what attracts me.

Furthermore, if it is designed in an attractive way that fits with the store environment. Neither a tablet on a stick nor an antiquated ATM-like machine attracts me there.

Have you experienced challenges finding your shoe size? Share your thoughts on how technology could improve your shopping experience!

► CONTACT US:
Alpine Kiosk – Elevating the world of self-service through unparalleled design and innovation.

At Alpine Kiosk, we redefine self-service through design and versatility. Our core philosophy is to harmonize stunning aesthetics with unparalleled modularity, ensuring that our kiosks are visually captivating and adaptable to any setting and requirement. Stay connected with us on our social media channels for the latest updates and insights into the evolving world of kiosk design.

► FIND US HERE:

► Website: Custom Self-Service Kiosks for Multiple Industries | Alpine Kiosk
► YouTube: Alpine Kiosk
► LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/alpine-kiosk

Related Links

Post Article Summary

  1. Offline vs. Online Shopping:
    • Online shoe return rates can be as high as 35-40% due to fit issues, as customers can’t try shoes on before buying.
    • Physical stores have a lower return rate of 8-10% because customers can try on shoes in-store.
  2. Challenges in In-Store Shopping:
    • Finding the right shoe size in-store can be time-consuming.
    • Customers may visit multiple stores to find their size
    • Waiting for staff to check availability can lead to frustration.
  3. Technology Solutions:
    • Self-service kiosks with real-time inventory information can enhance the in-store experience
    • Kiosks can provide details about size availability, nearby stores, and similar models.
    • Store owners should focus on maximizing benefits by ensuring all sizes are available and reducing waiting times.
  4. Synergy of Service:
    • Both self-service kiosks and human interaction have their place.
    • Kiosks handle routine tasks efficiently, allowing staff to focus on personalized service.

Sense of Humor

Yes we have one.

Restaurant Research – Concerns for Toast’s TAM

toast pos kiosk

The Legitimate Concerns for Toast’s TAM

As published on Reforming Retail May 2024 — Not much of a kiosk is shown on their website. Almost appears to be card swipe and is the quintessential lollipop on a stick config.

Another scintillating article by Jordan Thaeler this time on Toast, which seems to come up quite a bit.  We’ve included some helpful and informative comments we saw on LinkedIn as well. As always we highly recommend buying a subscription and supporting Jordan.

Preface definition – The fundamental math equation for calculating TAM is a very simple multiplication problem: Average revenue per user (ARPU) times the total number of potential customers in the target market. ARPU is pretty straightforward and can be adjusted as part of the business planning process, but the second part of the equation is trickier.

TAM = (ARPU * total potential customers in market)

External data sources are often used to calculate the total potential customers, whether that means relying on industry analysts or government statistics. But those sources rarely divide the market up exactly how a particular company views it. So, while these statistics can be a starting point, some additional effort must be made to get to a number that more accurately represents the number of likely customers.


We don’t have it out for Toast.

Toast is perhaps one of the greatest execution stories in the history of retail. Lots of helpful tailwinds, sure, but still some amazing execution.

And you have founders who are MIT-level smart that debase themselves on a daily basis to sell to people that don’t even care about anything.

Talk about charity work.

Our beef with Toast is that they’re not transparent, and their culture is a product of greed. Former sales people we’ve talked with are so aggressive it’s no wonder they haven’t penetrated enterprise.

But then again you have to be that tenacious to find any growth in an industry with miserably high churn and an even more miserably high number of morons as customers.

Because despite Toast’s execution, they’re still selling to “the worst set of clients in the world” according to Jim Cramer.

And we agree.

The following will make clear exactly what these challenges pose for Toast’s real TAM.

Upmarket

This is the most obvious black eye for Toast, having hired an absolute legend to run the enterprise division only to cut the entirety of their division during COVID.

Toast’s enterprise efforts were further foiled as they lost Jamba Juice at the end of 2022.

That said, we know several 100-unit chains that use Toast, and a few more of that magnitude that are testing Toast in labs.

Toast lacks some features that larger customers need, but their biggest challenge is their reputation as the payment bros of POS. Toast hoisted the white flag with their Freedom Pay partnership, giving larger customers payments flexibility, but (nearly) every CIO we’ve talked with is still skeptical that the company won’t screw them, or screw their customers (hello $1 ordering fee), which in turn sours the restaurant’s reputation.

It’s just too big of a risk, especially as Toast bleeds $400M in annual losses.

There are two legitimate, relatively large POS players upmarket today – PAR and Oracle. (Revel is discounted nearly immediately because nobody in enterprise wants to use expensive iOS devices).

Toast would need to out-execute these companies to win the market.

Oracle has an insane feature moat, and it’s Oracle: a brand that larger merchants (think Starbucks, McDonald’s, et al.) feel comfortable selecting to support their efforts. This is a long battle for Toast.

A little more downstream is PAR, although they just won Burger King’s US business and could take the entire RBI portfolio on POS, ordering, and loyalty. That said, PAR is more imminently surpassable by Toast, as PAR lacks the scale (only a $1.1B company) and feature maturity of Oracle. PAR is also thin when it comes to a true table service feature set, meaning it’s a bit of a lopsided competitor to Toast.

There are ~300K US enterprise restaurant locations according to NPD Research, so not exactly a small market, but small by profit: PAR is making $3K per store annually for POS and order routing on Burger King, and only $500 per store annually for POS at Arby’s.

Toast is currently netting $12,000 per store, still not profitable, and will need to ratchet that to $19,000 annually pretty shortly to be a rule of 40 company.

Even taking the mean of PAR’s ACV above, that’s $1,750 per year per store in enterprise for POS+.

That’s roughly 15% of what Toast makes today, and will be 9% of what Toast will be making on an SMB once they reach profitability.

Does Toast really want to move upmarket given this math?

The dirty secret with enterprise merchants is that it’s a forever slog of customizations, and gross margins are fucking horrendous. No payments to save Toast here. At least not above the table.

If Toast truly believes in their brand and inbound funnel, Toast could likely churn through 2-20 SMB customers (depends how Toast would calculate CAC for inbound and how Toast rationalizes the absurd length of restaurant enterprise sales) before it would even make sense to support an enterprise merchant.

While upmarket seems near-term untenable, we’re not sure it’s a market Toast really wants to be in, despite the nominal TAM expansion.

ARPU Expansion

We’re going to yell this until we’re blue in the face, but there’s no such thing as material ARPU expansion in restaurants, and retail more broadly.

These people just do NOT pay for value.

As someone once said, you can’t sell value to people if they’re too dumb to understand it. In those instance you will only make money if you steal from them.

It ain’t wrong.

If you comb through Ks and Qs of public retailers you’ll see that they spend pittance on technology.

Bottoms-up and top-down math continues to demonstrate that it’s 10-20 bps of their gross revenues. This is clearly excluding payments fees, which are NOT technology spend, and the percentages of spend are a bit higher in SMB segments simply because revenues are lower per store (e.g. a store doing $1M in annual revenues is going to pay $5K annually for a POS, which is already 50 bps).

It’s not that technology doesn’t create value – far from it.

It’s that the retailers aren’t smart enough to put together a business case to understand the ROI.

We suspect this is what Toast is finally realizing.

Shit, these restaurants won’t pay any more for bolt-ons no matter how valuable they are.

Here’s a way to prove our point.

Go find a restaurant solutions company that achieved a meaningful revenue milestone ($100M ARR) in an investible period (< 5 years) of time.

Bet you can’t find one that didn’t steal from the restaurant.

Shut up and repeat: restaurants won’t pay for value.

Anecdotally we believe the ARPU expansion Toast sees today is because they’re automatically charging more for software that was made free in an introductory offering and the restaurants just don’t have the time/IQ to catch it.

Toast account rep: Hey it looks like you’re having a problem with your labor: it’s too high.

Restaurant: Muh butthole iz a-itchin

Toast account rep: Uhhh, okay, well look we have this-

Restaurant: not now I’m gunna itch my butthole reallllll guud

Toast account rep: … I think you mean scratch but leave me out of it-

Restaurant: Oh dang, I dun havt the poop on muh nails again. Gotta lick em off ‘for I make this fuud

Toast account repI hate my life

RestaurantNom, nom, nom

Toast account rep: Okay well great, we’ll set you up with our labor management software. It’s free for 90 days then we’ll start billing-

Restaurant: MMMM this be guuuuuuu-

Toast account rephangs up receiver so fast there’s a thunderclap

Toast can only increase ARPU if they find things restaurants are already spending money on, build a replacement, and then charge substantially more in the payment stream, which merchants don’t know how to audit.

Geography

As Toast moves East into Europe – or really any OECD country not named USA – we question their revenue potential.

In the US, which has the most expensive cost of payments globally due to our fake capitalism (ie we want capitalism but actually behave statist – see how long it took Square to get a bank license, for instance), Toast can rip high margins on merchants doing $1M in GPV.

Use this table as the standard: Toast is ripping 2-3x expected margins.

In Europe, interchange is capped at 0.3%. Acquirers still add margins, but acquirers we know in Europe tell us that the margins aren’t nearly as thick once accounting for international card mix (very expensive cost of acceptance) and chargebacks.

This graphic from Sapphire Ventures lays out the EU payments margins pretty well:

Note that the acquirers here are making a fair 10bps.

Now, this is likely a diagram for larger merchants, but it’s reasonable to expect that Toast will find itself only staring downward from 30 bps of margin on their target customer.

And unlike in the US, where Toast’s average merchant does $1M of GPV, making CAC:LTV a little more tenable, in the EU the average SMB does far less volume.

For example, look at this graphic of average monthly revenue of food establishments in France.

Or if you go the other way, European food sales are projected to be about $700B annually on a base of 890,00 restaurant locations.

That’s $100K-$200K euros per rooftop.

These merchants won’t accept Toast’s rack rate on software pricing, which is nearly $6,000 per year in the US ($587M ARR / 99,000 locations).

And even if Toast rips 100 bps on $200K in turnover, that’s only $2,000 annually.

Because look at the competition: the gold standard we’ve seen in POS with any sort of outbound sales motion is eposnow, who boostrapped itself to meaningful revenue with inside sales and marketing. Honestly, what they’ve done is worth a case study in its own right.

Eposnow is charging < $1,500 annually for software, and maybe making 40bps on payments for a merchant doing $200K in turnover (another $1,000 generously).

At these numbers Toast cannot rely on their current distribution models where CAC is $10,000, because they’ll burn too much money to make it work.

Instead, Toast will either need to go after a very, very small segment of the market that does higher turnover, or fight amongst everyone else for inbound leads.

Toast is a great business – or at least can be when they streamline US operations to cut out costs.

But we aren’t betting on them to be the POS for everyone who serves food globally.

 

Toast has always been purposefully designed for small and medium-sized businesses (around 112,000 locations). Venturing into the enterprise market requires a different approach and significantly increases product demands. Few restaurant technology companies that started with SMBs have successfully transitioned to major enterprises.
In fact, many have moved in the opposite direction to target a larger total addressable market (e.g., Olo and Punchh Companies that tried to do everything from the start, chasing features and customization, often failed to survive. Despite this, I remain optimistic about Toast’s potential.
It’s also important to acknowledge the recent achievements of Qu POS in the QSR sector when discussing upmarket players. Additional factors to consider include deployment capabilities, complementary products/features, and company culture. Toast focuses on building, while most competitors rely on acquisitions, which makes integrating acquired technologies challenging. I’ve seen companies churning business daily, not because of their core POS, but due to the integration issues/wrong fit with the technologies they acquired to boost ARPU.
Jeremy Theisen well said
Jeremy Theisen I really appreciate your explicit callout of company culture. The solidified DNA of an organization is often overlooked. True that Toast doesn’t generally acquire tech/companies, but they are “acquiring” experienced enterprise talent and integrating them into a high-performing SMB organization that is a decade+ in the making.
When watching POS companies in general, I often think of the phrase, “Just because you can doesn’t mean you should.”
Ben Pryor I couldn’t agree more! Because of the culture that they have built, which in my opinion, is so vastly different from legacy POS companies I’ve never viewed them as a POS company. Heck at NRA I shared an Uber with 2 of my favorites that are leading this new refreshing approach to POS, Kelly Sennatt Esten and Niko Papademetriou. I proposed we record a POS reality podcast but no takers lol!
That was a fun ride and conversation! I think Kelly is a terrific example of professionalism and knowledge, a constant in our industry who pushes me to work harder and continue to self develop… It’s been a fun ride so far with so much more to come!

Really enjoying watching the conversation here. I think the TAM for any POS company depending on the segment they focus on is pretty large. If you are SMB focused as Toast is, there is plenty of opportunity there.

If you are focused on enterprise to Jeremy Theisen‘s point a completely different segment. There is plenty of white space there as well.

Honestly I continue to believe that we will end up with a fully integrated OMS with conditional logic closer to a Shopify within the restaurant space.

Niko Papademetriou Same to you, Niko! So glad we got some time together at NRA. I always look forward to catching up – one of the best parts of our industry is the people.
More Articles

Food Delivery and CEO Wonder Marc Lore

food delivery

He’s Not Just Looking to Make a Quick Billion

Super article on NY Times on Food Delivery. Marc Lore, the entrepreneur behind Diapers.com and Jet.com, would like to disrupt food delivery. But he really wants to build a brand that actually lasts.

Elizabeth G. Dunn
By Elizabeth G. Dunn
March 10, 2024

Summary

  • Marc Lore’s Ventures: The article discusses Marc Lore, an entrepreneur known for Diapers.com and Jet.com, and his various ventures post-Walmart.com, including a nuclear fusion startup, flying taxis, and a planned city.
  • Wonder Startup: Lore’s current focus is on Wonder, a food delivery startup aiming to solve common issues with food delivery speed and quality, initially using cooking vans and now operating from fixed locations.
  • Business Growth: Wonder has expanded rapidly, acquiring Blue Apron, partnering with Walmart, and planning for an IPO with a target valuation of $30 billion, despite the challenges faced by previous food delivery startups.
  • Innovative Model: The company’s model involves preparing and partially cooking food in commissary kitchens, then finishing it quickly at local Wonder locations, allowing for a diverse menu and efficient service.

Excerpt: When Marc Lore, the e-commerce billionaire, left his position as the chief executive of Walmart.com in 2021, he began to dabble in a variety of long-odds attempts to change the world. He backed a nuclear fusion start-up, and another designing flying taxis. Frustrated with the current state of capitalism, he embarked on plans to build, from scratch, a Bjarke Ingels-designed city of five million in the American West.

Recently, though, Mr. Lore has put all that aside to focus on an even bigger moonshot: solving dinner.

Mr. Lore’s business ideas often begin with a widely felt consumer frustration and back into a solution. In the aughts, his company Diapers.com keyed in on the annoyance, for new parents, of having to constantly run out for more diapers; imagine if they could be delivered to your door? His latest scheme, a start-up called Wonder, exists to tackle food delivery, which Mr. Lore believes too often disappoints customers by arriving too slowly.

Wonder’s opening salvo, in 2021, was flooding the New Jersey suburbs with hundreds of Mercedes Sprinter vans that could cook menus designed by celebrity chefs like Bobby Flay or José Andrés in customers’ driveways. Demand for food delivery is most concentrated in cities, but Mr. Lore thought that the suburbs held plenty of untapped potential; a van-based strategy faced more challenges in crowded urban environments, which the company planned to work up to.

Initially, after founding the company, Mr. Lore (rhymes with story) was involved only as an adviser and investor. Then in late 2022, shortly after a $350 million capital raise brought Wonder’s funding total to $800 million, he took over leadership of the company, installing himself as chief executive.

“This is once in a lifetime,” Mr. Lore told me, with characteristic zeal. “This could be the Amazon of food and beverage.”

Marc Lore, who co-founded Diapers.com, has invested more than $200 million of his own money into Wonder. “This is once in a lifetime,” Mr. Lore said. “This could be the Amazon of food and beverage.”Credit…Amir Hamja/The New York Times

 

Revel Acquisition by Shift4`

revel shift4

Revel & Shift4

Analysis of acquisition of Revel by Shift4 — From Reforming Retail.

Excerpt

Mistruth #1

Shift4 offers payments and other technology to a range of industries, including restaurants. Its restaurant POS system, SkyTab, is used by operators of many large chains, including Burger King, Applebee’s and Denny’s.

Huh?

Here’s how Shift4’s communications will go:

Shift4 to Revel merchants: our bugs won’t be fixed and you won’t get the features you need. But we have better news: you now get to pay 5x market rates for payments so our CEO can space walk! Aren’t we generous?!

What’s interesting is that as of late, Shift4 is hiding that they cornhole restaurants (and no, we’re not talking about an innocuous game of tossing bean bags into a hole on a slanted piece of plywood).

Used to be that they broke out payment margins by vertical, but we have to go all the way back to Q3 2022 to get to the truth of the matter.

Let’s bring this image back up so all the Revel merchants can prophylactically start covering their rectums for what’s coming.

Summary

  • Shift4’s Acquisition of Revel: The article discusses Shift4’s purchase of Revel for $250M, which is considered a low amount compared to the high 9-figure offers Revel received in 2020/2021.
  • Misleading Claims: The author criticizes Shift4 for allegedly overstating the use of its SkyTab POS system by large chains and inflating R&D expenditure figures to show higher net income.
  • Payment Processing Concerns: Revel is accused of overcharging for payment processing, and the author warns that Shift4 may significantly increase rates for Revel merchants.
  • Technology Integration Doubts: The article expresses skepticism about Shift4’s ability to successfully integrate Revel’s technology into its SkyTab system, given the challenges faced by other companies in similar endeavors.

More Articles

 

OLO Part 3 – Failed Acquisition

olo restaurant

Exposing Olo Part 3: Dropping 40% of Olo’s Enterprise Value into Wisely

Both McDonalds and Five Guys Burgers and Fries compete on a daily basis to offer the public hamburgers and fries. In 2014, McDonald’s spent more than $988 million on advertising. Five Guys Burgers and Fries, in the same year, spent exactly $0. Continuing analysis of Olo by Reforming Retail.

Here’s a summary of the key points:

  • Olo’s Acquisition of Wisely: Olo spent 40% of its enterprise value to acquire Wisely, a restaurant marketing tool, but the acquisition has not been successful in generating the expected revenue1.
  • Management Decisions: The article criticizes Olo’s management for poor decision-making and execution post-acquisition, leading to underperformance and shareholder dissatisfaction.
  • Technical Challenges: There were technical issues between Wisely and Olo, particularly with payment token data integration, which hindered Wisely’s effectiveness.
  • Comparison with PAR: The article contrasts Olo’s acquisition of Wisely with PAR’s acquisition of Punchh, highlighting PAR’s better management and transparent reporting leading to revenue growth.

RR provides an in-depth analysis of Olo’s business decisions and their impact on the company’s performance.

Excerpt:
Let’s look at a totally different acquisition in the same, terrible restaurant industry: PAR acquired Punchh, a loyalty marketing platform in mid-2021 and since then Punchh has more than doubled revenue to $64M, representing a 29% IRR (we can ascertain this because PAR reports business lines separately and transparently).

This points to the biggest culprit being Olo’s management, both in their decisions on what assets to acquire, and post-acquisition execution (or lack thereof).

The second red flag was/is the legitimate technical hiccup between Wisely and Olo.

More Articles

Self Checkout Trends for Walmart and Target

Self Checkout is Getting Second Wind Thanks to Retail Theft

From article at MRCTV May 2024

walmart self-checkoutSummary of the key points:

  • Rising Retail Theft: Major retailers like Walmart and Target are closing self-checkout terminals due to a spike in shoplifting, leading to a loss called “shrink” which surged nearly $20 billion in a year
  • Self-Checkout Evolution: The self-checkout (SCO) technology is evolving with the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) to combat theft, using cameras and sensors to detect unscanned items.
  • Adapting Business Models: Retailers are adjusting their SCO-to-cashier ratio and introducing measures like attended SCOs and receipt-scanning gates to prevent shoplifting.
  • Future of SCOs: Despite challenges, the SCO technology is poised for a comeback with new AI-powered systems expected to be deployed by the end of 2024

Main issues and developments regarding self-checkout systems in retail as discussed on the page.

Excerpt

Target, for example, is using artificial intelligence (AI) to develop a new system that uses cameras and sensors to detect items that shoppers fail to scan. It will create audio and visual alerts and identify shoppers who ignore notifications and repeatedly fail to scan their items after being prompted, Daily Mail reports. Target is hoping to deploy the new AI-powered SCO technology in all stores by the end of 2024.

The SCO business model is also adapting to prevent shoplifting:

The one of the biggest problems is that retailers been too zealous, often overweighting their checkout mix of SCOs and cashiers, industry analysts say. While a good rule of thumb is to have ratio of one SCO for every one cashier, some retailers are currently using a ratio of four or more SCOs per human cashier.

Thus, as retailers continue to gain experience with self-checkout, they’re adjusting their store’s ratio to find a mix that both improves the customer’s shopping experience and also protects the retailer’s bottom line.

More Checkout links

 

Credit Card Interchange – VISA MC Settlement

credit card interchange

Credit Card Interchange Post VISA/MC Agreement

We all heard about the settlement with VISA and Mastercard and how consumers would see benefit.  Unfortunately that is only a headline, not a fact.  Once again Jordan with Reforming Retail breaks the settlement down, and what we find is same old same old (increasing rates).  I like his cookies analogy where there are three ingredients: eggs, flour and sugar.  After much discussion the cookie manufacturers agree to lower the cost of eggs.  But guess what — the flour and sugar are going up.

Get a subscription to Reforming Retail to stay in the know is our advice.

Here’s a Pilot summary of the key points:

  • 20-Year Litigation: discusses a lengthy legal battle involving Visa and Mastercard, accused of operating a duopoly and imposing excessive fees
  • Settlement Outcome: It highlights that the settlement benefits lawyers more than merchants, with no significant changes for small businesses.
  • Swipe Fees Data: The article provides data showing a record $160 billion in swipe fees paid by U.S. merchants in 2022, a 16.7% increase from 2021
  • Fundamental Change Needed: The text argues that without a fundamental restructuring of the payment system, merchants will continue to face unfair fees

The article is critical of the current payment system and suggests that real change is necessary for merchants to benefit.

Here’s your Chat GPT summary of the Visa, Mastercard settlement:

  • After 20 years of litigation there’s no practical change and merchants will continue to get screwed
  • The lawyers are the real winners, reaping billions of dollars despite a useless outcome
  • Visa and Mastercard will continue making unlimited money via non-Interchange fees (i.e. dues and assessments)
  • Small merchants on flat-rate pricing will see any potential benefit accrue to their processors
  • Zero practical changes to surcharging despite the lip service

The Visa, Mastercard Settlement Is A Massive Joke And A Waste of Everyone’s Time

The winners?

The lawyers.

In fact, in reading the outcome of the settlement we’re convinced that the plaintiffs’ lawyers knew that their clients weren’t actually going to receive any benefit.

That’s right merchants: after this settlement you can… keep bending over and taking even more from the payments ecosystem.

In no way, shape, or form do merchants win, particularly the “small business” variety for which Visa and Mastercard so arduously fight to protect from… themselves? We never understood their positioning, frankly.

And nor will merchants ever win without a fundamental restructuring of payments as we know it.

Some data:

FACT: Per Nilson Report, in 2022, U.S. merchants paid a record $160 billion in swipe fees. This represents a 16.7% increase in fees from 2021.

FACT: Despite the pandemic and inflationary pressures, swipe fees continue to rise. The average rate of YoY costs rose from 7% between 2013 and 2020, to 21% afterwards. Initial estimates suggest card fee hikes could cost U.S. retailers over $500 million

FACT: American merchants—retailers, restaurants, contractors and anyone that accept credit cards—pay five times more in swipe fees for the exact same transaction than VISA and Mastercard charge businesses in other countries.

Note that this growth in fees generally tracks the growth in US credit card volume:

But that, even normalizing for volume, card fees increase regardless:

That’s because Visa and Mastercard (and to lesser extent Amex) are utilities, protected by banking and finance laws that ensure that utilities continue to reap tens of billions a year in what is tantamount to EBITDA (the card schemes have no real costs and one only need examine Pix to quantify the expense of both building and maintaining a real-time payment network supporting trillions of dollars in volume; hint, it’s a few million dollars).

Let’s break our discussion/analysis into three buckets.

Interchange “Cap” Does Not Equal Lower Processing Costs

Talk about a con job.

What great collusion from the attorneys on this one.

Plaintiff Attorneys: Okay, so our law firm can’t make billions without something to show for it. What can you offer us?

Defendant Attorneys: Hmm… what if we agree that our clients will lower “Interchange”?

Plaintiff Attorneys: Wait: won’t that affect your client’s revenues? I own a lot of their stock since they’re duopolies with infinite pricing power and I need that to pay from my wife’s 9th rhinoplasty.

Defendant Attorneys: LOLz. Bro, do you even litigate? “Interchange” caps mean nothing! Our clients have dues, assessments, and other fees that they can add to their hearts’ desire to ensure that they keep crushing the quarter so your wife won’t look a day over 77.

Plaintiff Attorneys: Thank you, Jesus!

Defendant Attorneys: Just remember who did you a solid when your firm takes your $2B payday.

Plaintiff Attorneys: Oh, don’t you worry: I’ll definitely be calling my wife’s plastic surgeon to tell him that your wife’s next boob job is on me.

Defendant Attorneys: Perfect. See at our 8 AM tee time tomorrow.

Let’s see if we can’t put this into an easier analogy to follow.

Imagine that you belong to a race of people that must eat cookies to survive.

Cookies have three ingredients: eggs, flour, and sugar.

There are only two cookie manufacturers, and they are very aware that your entice race of people will die without cookies.

And they keep increasing the price of cookies.

Well, some of you cookie-eaters band together and sue the cookie manufacturers.

After much hemming and hawing, the two cookie manufacturers agree to lower the price of eggs.

Your lawyers pat themselves on the back.

But you’re no fool.

You know that there are two other ingredients in the cookies.

Without a guarantee that the flour and sugar will also come down in cost, the cookies might be more expensive.

Not only might, but with near certainty will be more expensive given the history of the cookie manufacturers.

WTF?

Note: we are not anti-capitalists by any stretch of the imagination. Indeed, we are about as pro free-market as one can get. But Visa and Mastercard do NOT operate in a free market, and that is the delusion here.

Visa and Mastercard are free to change non-Interchange fees as they see fit, and we guarantee that they will.

Watch.

There will be no missing earnings despite the optics this settlement might have you believe.

SMB Merchants Get Hosed

Let us tell you a story from 9 years ago.

In a far away land called Europa, the governing bodies looked at the costs of payment acceptance and viewed them as a tax on their constituents (never mind that Europa had a seemingly endless number of other taxes that drove many businesses to establish operations elsewhere).

In 2015 these governing bodies passed a law called PSD2 that included provisions to lower the cost of payments acceptance.

How?

By reducing the cost of interchange, or the amount that the card issuing banks and card schemes take from each card transaction.

But the people working in those governing bodies had never actually had a real job, or they would know better.

Just because one decrees something doesn’t make it so.

The governing bodies had clearly forgotten about mercedem fratibus, colloquially known as merchant acquirers, or to all our readers, payment bros.

This particular group of individuals believe it their God-given responsibility to ensure that merchants receive no such savings from any decree, and that instead those savings end up in their own pockets.

And that’s precisely what transpired.

European Commission study in 2020 found that the interchange caps redistributed revenues from interchange: merchants saved $1.2B Euros annually, and then merchant acquirers gained $1.2B Euros annually.

The merchants who recognized the savings?

Large, tier 1 merchants that hired their own payment bro consultants.

Back to the US settlement…

Under the agreed-upon guidelines, Visa and Mastercard would reduce swipe rates by at least four basis points (0.04 percentage points) for three years and ensure an average rate that is seven basis points below the current average for five years.

These savings will not reach SMB merchants because their processors are nearly exclusively flat-rate their processing pricing. So instead of their merchants seeing the benefit on an interchange plus pricing model, their merchants are paying a flat, fixed percentage on each transaction, with savings accreting to the processor.

Just like in that magical land of Europa, these processors will see a 7 bps increase in EBITDA.

Not revenue: EBITDA.

As far as this blog’s coverage is concerned, here’s who stands to benefit:

  • Toast
  • Square
  • Shopify
  • Lightspeed

The math for these guys will be quite compelling. Toast for example, does $126B of GPV. 7 bps on this is $88M.

Of free money.

The Surcharging Changes Do Nothing

There’s a lot of indigestion over surcharging.

Smart consumers hate it. The average consumer who thinks that they’re earning 1% cash back by paying via card is actually losing 3% to pay via card as processors convince more merchants to surcharge.

The card schemes hate it because the above math should, at some point, lead consumers to use alternative payment methods (but Americans are nearly as financially illiterate as merchants).

Payment bros love it. What easier way to make free money than to surcharge?

But those asshole card schemes are capping my surcharge income by decreasing the surcharge limits to 3%. It should be a much more reasonable cap of 3,000,000%. That feels fair for the value I provide.

No shortage of animosity.

And confusion.

That’s because if you actually read the surcharging language in the merchant rules for Visa, Mastercard, and Amex, you’ll find discordance that makes it impermissible to surcharge.

Since this settlement pertains to Visa and Mastercard we need to read the Amex rules:

3.2. Treatment of the American Express Brand

Merchants must not… impose any restrictions, conditions, disadvantages, or fees when the Card is accepted that are not imposed equally on all Other Payment Products, except for electronic funds transfer, or cash and check,

https://www.americanexpress.com/content/dam/amex/us/merchant/new-merchant-regulations/Reference-Guide_EN_US.pdf

FIS does a great job producing collateral that explains the discordance:

Amex has a non-discrimination policy, but their regulations require imposing equal treatment across all Other Payment products. A payment product is defined as any charge, credit, debit, stored value, prepaid, smart card, account access devices or other payment cards, services or products other than the Card. Since the Amex requirement includes debit and prepaid products and it is against Visa and Mastercard rules to surcharge debit and prepaid products, merchants wishing to charge a surcharge would be considered non-compliant (from an Amex rules perspective) in certain scenarios.

https://empower2.fisglobal.com/rs/092-EMI-875/images/Merchant%20Surcharging%20Guide%20External%2001132023.pdf

Embedding below for convenient reading.

None of the merchant rules make sense because none of the card schemes actually want merchants to surcharge.

In comes this VIsa, Mastercard settlement to confuse surcharging even more… but it’s for absolutely nothing.

Motion for the sake of motion with nothing substantive accomplished.

At least the proposed surcharging language is consistent with the rest of the settlement and is, in itself, a huge joke and waste of everyone’s time.

Borrowing from TSG’s analysis, here are the four main points as the settlement pertains to surcharging:

  • Brand Level Surcharge Rules on Credit (not Debit) Cards: A brand-level surcharge is one in which the merchant imposes the same surcharge on all of a particular network’s (e.g., Visa’s) credit cards regardless of the issuing bank (e.g., Chase) or the product (e.g., Visa Signature card). Under the Settlement Agreement, a merchant can surcharge all Visa-Branded Credit Cards up to 1% regardless of whether the merchant also surcharges other comparator credit cards that it accepts, e.g., American Express or Discover. Under the Settlement Agreement, a merchant can surcharge all Visa-Branded Credit Cards up to 3% (or the merchant’s cost of acceptance if it is less than 3%), if the merchant either (a) does not accept other comparator credit cards (e.g., American Express or Discover) or (b) does accept those comparator credit cards but also surcharges them in at least the same amount. The same rules apply to surcharging Mastercard-Branded Credit Cards at the brand level.
  • Product Level Surcharge Rules on Credit (not Debit) Cards: A product-level surcharge is one in which the merchant imposes the same surcharge on all of the network’s (e.g., Visa’s) credit cards of a specific product type, e.g., Visa Signature credit cards, regardless of the issuing bank (e.g., Chase). Under the Settlement Agreement, a merchant can surcharge a particular Visa-Branded Credit Card product up to 1% regardless of whether the merchant also surcharges the comparable products of other comparator credit cards that it accepts (e.g., American Expressor Discover). Under the Settlement Agreement, a merchant can surcharge a particular Visa-Branded Credit Card product up to 3% (or the merchant’s cost of acceptance if it is less than 3%), if the merchant either (a) does not accept other comparator credit cards (e.g., American Express or Discover) or (b) does accept those comparator credit cards but also surcharges their comparable products in at least the same amount. If the merchant cannot readily determine its cost of acceptance of the Visa product at the point-of-sale, before authorization using electronic data, the merchant can consider its cost of acceptance to be 3%. The same rules apply to surcharging Mastercard-Branded Credit Cards at the product level.
  • Surcharging Visa but not Mastercard, and Vice-Versa: The Settlement Agreement provides that, subject to the rules described above, a merchant may surcharge Visa-Branded Credit Cards (at the brand or product level) but not Mastercard-Branded Credit Cards (at the brand or product level), or surcharge Visa-Branded Credit Cards at one level (brand or product) and surcharge Mastercard-Branded Credit Cards at a different level (brand or product), and vice versa, in any combination.
  • No-Discounting and Non-Discrimination Rules: Visa and Mastercard will modify their “no discounting” and “non-discrimination” rules to clarify that merchants may offer discounts to their customers at the issuer level, i.e. discounts that vary by the issuing financial institution of the credit or debit card.

In plain English:

  • You still can’t surcharge more than 3% even if your cost of acceptance is higher than 3% (it happens)
  • You can’t practically surcharge any card brand (e.g. Visa) more than any other card brand (e.g. Mastercard)
  • Technically any surcharging is still impermissible if the merchant accepts Amex

So, in effect, no actual benefit to merchants.

Shocker.

This is how absurd this whole thing is.

Imagine you’re in the market to buy a car and you want a lower price.

You: What’s the best you can do on price?

Car dealer: How about I call a random person in India?

You: Huh? What’s that have to do with anything?

Car dealer: I know: I’ll eat a salad for lunch tomorrow!

You: Are you f*cking high? What is wrong with you?

This conversation, in essence, summarizes the entirety of this settlement.

Here’s your Chat GPT summary of the Visa, Mastercard settlement:

  • After 20 years of litigation there’s no practical change and merchants will continue to get screwed
  • The lawyers are the real winners, reaping billions of dollars despite a useless outcome
  • Visa and Mastercard will continue making unlimited money via non-Interchange fees (i.e. dues and assessments)
  • Small merchants on flat-rate pricing will see any potential benefit accrue to their processors
  • Zero practical changes to surcharging despite the lip service

Payments: Infinity.

Merchants: Zero.

Related Credit Card Interchange Posts

Olo Restaurant – Reforming Retail

olo restaurant

Exposing Olo Part 1: Introduction

Note: if restaurants spent even 1% of their revenues on technology that would be $10B in annual revenues, or enough for 100 companies to make $100M in revenue, but of course there are only 5-8 companies in the US restaurant market that collect > $100M in sales (the variance depends how you define delivery companies like Doordash or Uber Eats).

After going public in 2021, Olo opened itself to public market investors. This brought in new lines of discourse and examination.

And this is precisely how we became involved.

While we generally stay away from following the public markets with any concerted effort, several of Olo’s investors were dogged in their requests that we look more closely at the company.

Our expertise and background were called into demand as sufficiently specific to help these investors sort out what was really happening with Olo.

And as we dug we found a consistent and troubling pattern of behavior.

Some of the behavior is actively under litigation, whether it’s the class action securities claim, or the three derivative cases (Floyd v. Glass, et al., Case No. 1:23-cv-03770 (S.D.N.Y.), Floyd v. Glass, et al., C.A. No. 2023-0560 (Del. Ch.), Balleh v. Glass, et al., C.A. No. 2023-1165 (Del. Ch.), and Giuda v. Glass, et al., C.A. No. 2024-0025 (Del. Ch.)).

But our research has led to a different, upstream culprit that we think all of Olo’s current plaintiffs have entirely missed.

This upcoming series represents the culmination of hundreds of hours of investigative journalism.

We spent time with current and former Olo executives, Olo investors, global private equity practices, potential acquirers of Olo, litigators, and experts on case law.

Our findings point to clear breaches of fiduciary, self-dealing, and alarming behavior from Raine Capital, one of Olo’s early financial backers, that would make any reasonable party wonder how there have been no criminal convictions.

Olo is on the record with the following:

The factual statements and legal conclusions in [Reformingretail’s] post are baseless and misleading. As we have previously disclosed, we have settled the securities class action lawsuit on favorable terms. Your unsupported assertion that there has been criminal activity has no basis in fact and is wrongful.

Olo

We’ll let the evidence speak for itself.

More Olo Background with Toast and PAR

Olo

Olo, founded almost 18 years ago as Go Mobo, was the first real phone ordering attempt for restaurants. After an absolutely painful stretch of time spent convincing restaurants that customer technology matters, they finally reached IPO status with a favorable COVID tailwind that literally made it illegal for some restaurants to conduct business any other way than online.

Now counting 83,000 restaurant rooftops as customers, Olo inarguably represents only chain locations. That’s because for the longest time Olo had a price minimum, and only larger groups could justify the cost. The reason for that was pretty simple: the cost to ingest menu data for a restaurant was the same whether you were 1 location or 100.

Olo acquired Omnivore as a way to start its move into POS and in-store commerce. They further acquired Wisely to offer marketing automation and CDP, and launched Olo Pay for online and instore commerce.

Olo’s biggest challenge is TAM.

SMB merchants are getting online ordering from their POS company, larger enterprise merchants build Olo internally (think Subway booting Olo), and as enterprise POS companies mature (see PAR above), online ordering is natively coming with the POS.

Because, truth be told, online ordering is not that hard to do.

It was 20 years ago, but today it’s not very complicated with cloud POS systems.

Now what?

Olo and PAR are on a collision course.

More Posts

Video

Robotic Restaurant News – AI Robotics

robotic restaurant

Robotic Restaurant News

We just got back from NRF and robotic restaurant stuff was all over the show floor. Robotic pizza for example.  One of our favorite aspects of AI is overhead cameras in the kitchen to monitor food preparation. Also table usage. Here is our wrap on recent robotic restaurant news

  • See our NRF 2024 review and writeup.  The show was terrific. Check out our photo gallery. The line at the pizza ordering kiosk to order the robotic pizza was very long.
  • From Tim Tang — “The most impressive thing that I saw at NRF 2024 for restaurants was the bartaco dine-in restaurant experience with Amazon Pay and OneDine.  This initiative demonstrated an intimate understanding and sensitivity to the guest experience while creatively solving a common industry tech debt challenge of legacy POS through an innovative collaboration with market leading technologies. With rising operational costs, an ongoing labor shortage and shrinking customer wallet, the restaurant industry will need  this type of thoughtful operational execution to thrive.”
  • Craig K — Robotics were something to see though the details are still being worked out (food source, etc).  On the kiosk side it was good to see Samsung kiosks adding accessibility finally. POS and mobile POS for employees and customers was EVERYWHERE.  Payment systems as well. AI was overblown and almost trite.  theroboburger.com
  • Recommended – Angela Diffly on Hospitality Technology wrapup. We contributed images and content.
  • Adam your robotic bartender — A dozen Adam robots have been deployed nationwide so far, in venues such as the Courtyard by Marriott in downtown Los Angeles, the Cloutea boba shop at Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas, and the Botbar Coffee chain. Adam also gets rented out for parties and conferences.A complete Adam with a custom setup table and equipment sells for $180,000, though Casella says they’re experimenting with other pricing models and partnerships.
  • How Restaurants Are Embracing Robots — All the big chain restaurants are testing and installing AI-infused robotics — mainly in the back of the house, but also in customer-facing roles, both tableside and at the drive-thru.  We tend to think a lot of testing is going on, but that is about it.
  • Aniai is bringing a burger-cooking robot to restaurants with $12M — Aniai, a startup that has built a burger-grilling robot, Alpha Grill, said today it has raised $12 million, bringing its total raise to $15 million. The money will go toward launching its first manufacturing facility, Factory One, in South Korea. The firm will also be deploying a cloud-based AI software platform for the robot called Alpha Cloud. Robot adoption in the restaurant business is becoming popular as it can help restaurants address their high pain points like labor shortages, and rising wage issues. Robotics enables restaurants to save 30% to 70% of labor costs, and restaurants could replace more than 80% of restaurant positions with robots, according to a research report

Statistics for Restaurant Robotics and AI Robotics

Robotic Restaurant Examples

there are some good examples of robotics being used by restaurants. Here are a few: